Abstract: To obtain required goods and services, firms can select from several governance modes, such as internal production, outsourcing, or hybrid arrangements (e.g., alliances). While significant work has addressed the performance implications of governance mode fit with characteristics of the good and environment, less attention has been directed toward implementation. If firms select the best governance mode but do not implement effectively, performance will suffer. Likewise, effective implementation can overcome the deficiencies of an inappropriate governance choice. This paper employs theories of organizational economics to explore the relationship between governance mode choice, implementation, and performance.

Abstract: This paper focuses on the role that alliance partner diversity (APD) plays in the probability of small high-tech firms’ exit. It contributes to the research in strategy and entrepreneurship by developing finer-grained theoretical arguments from ‘economizing’ and ‘strategizing’ perspectives in order to explain whether and why APD would differently determine firms’ exit by dissolution versus divestment. APD is considered as a strategic instrument that firms may use either to avoid involuntary dissolution or to realize a possibility of divestment. Empirical findings from biotechnology industry in France (1994-2002) contrast and complement existing evidence about APD’s negative effect on firms’ exit: APD is found to increase the risk of dissolution, while the relation is curvilinear in the case of divestment, and when considering both exit modes together.

Abstract: This paper investigates mechanisms that prevent firms from achieving the full benefits of horizontal alliances, focusing on how allied competitors rationalize their supplier portfolios after forming a purchasing alliance. We argue that the embeddedness of close ties with suppliers limits the client firms’ ability to rationalize purchasing through alliances, for both good and bad reasons. Allied firms seek to shelter close supplier relationships in order to protect relational rents that the ties generate. But the same mechanisms that produce relational rents also generate over-embeddedness: firms sometimes will engage in “bad habits” when they retain close ties. An analysis of 399 business allocation decisions made in a firm-wide purchasing alliance in a global manufacturing industry supports the arguments.

Abstract: This paper explains exclusivity in licensing alliances as a “contractual hostage” to better align the cooperative relationship between licensing parties. We also examine (product and geographic) scope restrictions in exclusive licenses as mechanisms that balance the parties respective concerns when agreeing to cooperate. We contribute to the sparse empirical work in this area by studying exclusivity in 243 publicly reported licensing alliances and find evidence consistent with the use of exclusivity to safeguard licensee investments in complementary assets and to facilitate contracting over early stage technologies. Geographic exclusivity restrictions are associated with market-specific (and international) licensee investments, and field-of-use restrictions with early stage technologies. Our results also suggest that relational governance mechanisms and scope restrictions are used as substitutes to manage similar transactional concerns with early stage technologies.